

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

The Director called Mr. John Richardson this date and advised him that he had made it a matter of policy from the day he joined the Agency to keep out of politics. He told Mr. Richardson that he was sure he would understand the reasons for this and said while he read with interest the enclosure to Mr. Richardson's letter, for the reason indicated above he would be unable to provide comments.

[Signature]
LSE

19 October 60

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
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
Nationalities for NIXON-LODGE

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October 14, 1960

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Enclosed is a draft statement on cold war policy prepared in response to what seems to me to be an urgent need for specific statements in this area by the Vice President. I am sure that you will not agree with all of it but if you are in accordance with any part and think that it is as important as I do in the light of the present political situation, I hope that you will convey your views to the Vice President.

Sincerely yours,

John Richardson, Jr.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE R)

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DRAFT STATEMENT FOR RU OF COLD WAR STRATEGY

Marxist-Leninist doctrine stresses the tactical importance of bewildering the enemy by alternating between "hard" and "soft" lines in the struggle to overthrow free societies. We saw this tactic applied just last spring in the sudden reversal of Soviet attitudes expressed in Khrushchev's outbursts at the Summit Conference.

But these policy zig-zags take place not only for offensive tactical reasons but also as a result of pressures arising within the Communist Empire -- and they can occur also as a result of pressures exerted from outside on the Communist block. Often the reasons for a change are interrelated.

The total failure and frustration of Khrushchev at the UN, brought about under the inspiring leadership of President Eisenhower, is unlikely to produce initially any softening in the Soviet line. On the contrary, the dictator's purposes in coming here having been frustrated and his tactics parried, pressures within and between the various Communist parties within the empire, as well as the external situation and his own emotional reaction, may induce an increase in tomorrow's viciousness and violence.

It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the West can affect Soviet policy, can induce retreats from over-extended positions, and reduce the risk of appalling dangerous miscalculation by the Communists. Historically all of these objectives have been achieved by the West although with far less consistency than we would wish.

What is absolutely essential in the future is that the Soviet Union not be freed of anxiety, safe from any threat that her status could be disturbed, free of any threat from her slave empire. Those who suggest

as Mr. Stevenson does repeatedly, that the Soviet Union say to be afraid of our military power, afraid we are going to attack them and therefore must be constantly reassured as to our policy, not only stare down the whole history of Soviet Communism, not only repeat precisely the same reasoning which led to Yalta, Potsdam and the whole sorry disorganized post-war retreat and appeasement -- they also unwittingly, patriotically, but none the less disastrously fall into the Soviet trap. A reassured Soviet Union, a Soviet Union free of anxiety, a Soviet Union free of any external pressure, is also a Soviet Union free to engage in trouble making all over the world.

We must always be prepared to negotiate from strength -- but we must always recognize that military strength, economic strength, social strength are not enough by themselves. Our purpose, the clarity of our objectives, the precision of our non-military strategy -- these elements of strength are equally important. We cannot afford to yield the Soviet Union the point that the area behind the Iron Curtain is out of bounds for economic and political warfare, while the Soviet Union is on the offensive all over the rest of the world. To do so could be fatal. It is so is to give the Soviet Union a green light for more Cubas, more Vietnams, all over the non-Communist world. Our primary purpose in the world today is to help all peoples to achieve their God-given right to freedom and to help them build free institutions to end political slavery, economic and social exploitation and to assure the benefits of the scientific revolution to all. Only when this is achieved can there be a real peace, a peace with justice. This objective applies first and foremost to the peoples enslaved within the Communist empire, to whom we owe a direct moral obligation as a result of our own blindness in the late war and early post-war period.

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We are engaged in a non-military protracted conflict with the rulers of the Communist empire. They are aware of it and I am aware of it. The ebb and flow of our national awareness of this crucial fact is perhaps the single most critical problem confronting America today.

The Communist leaders would have us think that the only evidence of war is blood on the battlefield; that disarmament means peace. Both statements are not only false, but seem to have thoroughly deluded some American political leaders who ought to know better.

War to the Communist leadership is total at all times. The question is always one of choice of weapons. If both sides were to destroy all nuclear capabilities, both military and non-military warfare could now be waged by the Communists, unless they should abandon every basic tenet of their doctrine, every lesson of their own success in their struggle for power since 1918.

What can we do, having first recognized the dimensions of the struggle and clarified our own objectives?

The answer is that we must concert our diplomatic, economic and political strategy to achieve our objectives. This I have proposed we do in the next administration under the leadership of Ambassador Lodge. We negotiate to reach our real objectives from real strength when Soviet anxiety is high, when the urge for freedom within the Empire is at a peak. We are able to protect the vulnerable areas of the world against Soviet harassment and encroachment, not only by economic, technical assistance, not only by fostering mutual understanding, but also by positive policies designed to impair Communist ability to harass and encroach on these areas. There are contradictions of the most fundamental nature within the Soviet empire between peoples and governments, between the various Communist parties, between nations, between classes, and, most fundamental of all, between truth and propaganda. This theoretical

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system contains the obvious seeds of its own eventual destruction.

We must see to it that those seeds are watered. It is in our self-interest. It is far less risky than the failure to recognize the nature of the struggle we are in -- with consequent inaction and reliance on the good will of governments which recognize no value in good will.

And such policies, pursued with determination and skill, offer the best hope of achieving freedom for oppressed nations without war, the best hope for the growth in freedom to economic and political stability of the undeveloped nations, the best hope for peace, justice and the rule of law in the world.

The above statement was prepared by John Richardson, Jr. based to a considerable extent on suggestions submitted by Leo Thomas.

October 4, 1960